

28 August 1950

Chief of Mission
Frankfurt, Germany

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Chief, INDOCHINA
Washington D. C.

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6	Sk. Sec.		
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3. On Wednesday, August 13, DT-6 received a telephone call at his home from Identity 1, with whom he had had no previous contact. Identity 1 claimed to know about DT-6's illegal propaganda activities and urgently requested an appointment with him in that connection, offering to come by and pick him up in his car if necessary. DT-6 made no appointment, but gave Identity 1's telephone number and agreed to contact him within a few days.

3. Identity 1's name and business address were immediately checked with the telephone information office. Identity 1 and his brother operate a fireworks workshop, located in the American Sector directly on the Soviet Zone border, which does the finishing work on fireworks and rockets produced in West Germany. His name was subsequently checked by us with BTLINEK, who reported that he had been used by them in 1950-1951 for the production of propaganda rockets but that there had been no dealings with him since the fall of 1951. He came to Berlin in 1948 and professes to be a political refugee although there is no evidence to support the claim. According to BTLINEK he has a fairly shady reputation among Berlin business colleagues. OTTENHEIM had also checked his background last year with a firm in Hamburg with whom he had allegedly been associated; according to this firm he was the Soviet appointed trustee of their factory in East Berlin from 1946 to 1948 from which he illegally obtained large personal profits, fleeing to West Berlin only when these illegal activities had come to the attention of the DDR authorities.

4. IT-6 at this point called in his regular security officer, a former member of the Luftwaffe-Forschungsamt, who has been handling routine investigations for the IT-6 group for the past two years, to make a preliminary check on Identity 1. On Friday, August 15, without making a previous telephone appointment, the security officer covered by two assistants contacted Identity 1 at his work shop. The security officer gave to

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and was carried out the first conversation with Identity 1. Identity 1 told the decoy DT-6 that his "West German backers" had heard of DT-6's operations, were aware of the fact that he was at the moment receiving no more money and were anxious to finance his operations to any extent necessary. (DT-6's Kaiser Ministry sponsored operations have been stopped since the end of May.) Identity 1 also produced one copy of a leaflet designed for distribution to the SPD (Deutsche Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands) of which he had 6,000 copies to be mailed and which he suggested for a DT-6 operation. The decoy DT-6, letting Identity 1 do the talking, agreed to think over the whole offer and to telephone Identity 1 for another meeting. Present at this meeting were Identity 1, his brother and a third unidentified man; in front of the work shop was parked a new light blue Opel Olympia with West Berlin (WB) license plates.

6. An appointment was made by the decoy DT-6 with Identity 1 by telephone for Tuesday, August 19, at Breitenbach Platz in the American Sector. The decoy DT-6 was covered by two men who observed the area during the full period of the meeting. Identity 1 arrived at the meeting place in a new dark blue Opel Olympia with the same license plates as those on the light blue car seen on Friday; two other men were in the car with him. The decoy DT-6 took Identity 1 to a cafe around a corner and out of sight of the Opel, where a 20 minute discussion took place. This consisted of a rehearsing and continuation of Friday's discussion. Identity 1 asked how much money would be required for immediate resumption of his operations; the decoy DT-6 estimated 12,000 DM, which Identity 1 claimed at that time he could get within 24 hours. Another appointment was made for Thursday, August 21, at the same place. In addition to the three men in the Opel, three other men were spotted by our two observers who were believed to be covering Identity 1's group; since the Opel during the meeting drove around to the cafe and stopped in front of it, it was presumed that a fourth man not spotted was also attending the meeting.

7. It seemed clear at this point that, provided the observations of the DT-6 decoy and his observers were accurate, the support officer was a kidnapping operation against DT-6. In order to carry the case through, and if possible to catch and prosecute the kidnap group, it was essential to bring the West Berlin police into the operation. The case was discussed with [] on Wednesday, August 20, and it was decided to turn it over to the Office of Public Safety-HICOG for police implementation. Public Safety is now handling the case through the Western Assistant of the American Sector, using the American controlled GCHS (German Central Investigation Section). In this way the operation is being overtly handled by West Berlin police, which would make possible normal street and presence; on the other hand close U.S. control is being maintained in order to insure effective carrying through of the operation and to avoid leakage through the central West Berlin police administration.

7. On Thursday, August 21, DT-6 and his decoy conferred with the Western Assistant and the Public Safety officer handling the case, and coordinated plans for police coverage of the meeting that afternoon.

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8. The decoy DT-6 met Identity 1 at Prenzlauer Platz for the second time on Thursday at 1700. Identity 1 suggested that they return to the original cafe; the decoy DT-6 suggested another which they entered after Identity 1 had indicated to the Opel the direction they were taking. Identity 1 did not produce the money but claimed that his banker was out of town at the moment requested; he reported however that his Berlin Cardfile man would be seeing the banker again the same day since he was by chance in Berlin. After additional probing for information about DT-6's operations (Identity 1 seemed to have only a very general idea of the danger newspaper projects and the Kaiser Ministry sponsorship) Identity 1 told the decoy DT-6 that he would telephone him again as soon as anything developed. The police and plainclothesmen who covered this meeting spotted, in addition to the three men in the Opel, three to four other men believed to be covering the meeting. They reported also that the Opel had arrived at 1630, a half hour before the appointment time, and twice during the meeting itself had moved to different positions on the Platz.

9. On Friday, August 22, the previous day's meeting was reviewed by the police with DT-6 and the decoy, and a plainclothesman assigned to the surveillance of Identity 1's work shop. At 1600 a woman drove up to the work shop in a new light blue Opel Olympia with West Berlin (GB) license plates. (These numbers were later checked and the Opel found to be registered in Identity 2's name.) The woman, Identity 1 and his brother and a third man (previously spotted in Identity 1's Opel) entered the light blue Opel and drove to the Cafe Wien in the British Sector where they met another man not previously observed. The conversation at Cafe Wien was carried on almost entirely by the unidentified man who had come with the group in the Opel and the man waiting for them at the cafe. When the group separated the four who had come in the Opel left together; the other man was followed to an East Berlin (GB) licensed car in which he drove off.

10. Identity 1 later telephoned DT-6; the call was taken by the decoy and a meeting arranged for Saturday, August 23, again at Prenzlauer Platz. The decoy met Identity 1 on Saturday and went again to the first cafe named. Identity 1 again produced no money but shifted his proposal to the DT-6. He proposed that he turn over to DT-6 his 6,000 marks for which DT-6 would receive 500 RM as an advance for distribution costs, 200 RM for the printing of special envelopes and another 500 RM after the completion of the operation. The DT-6 decoy was noncommittal but agreed to think over the offer and to telephone Identity 1. In contrast to the previous meeting the police observed no one covering the meeting for Identity 1.

11. Conclusions. The following tentative conclusions can be drawn from the events as described above.

a. It seems probable in view of what is known about Identity 1 and his brother, and in view of the Cafe Wien meeting observed on Friday, August 22, that the leaders of the operation are the two unidentified men observed at the Cafe Wien; Identity 1 and his brother are believed to be only the operation's middle-men.

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b. It seems possible in view of the original telephone call that it was first intended to use Identity 1's work shop, because of its location on the Soviet Zone border, as the place of abduction. There appears to be some doubt by the police as to whether the work shop is actually in the American Sector at all. If this was intended the plan was frustrated by the decoy's premature and unexpected first appearance at the work shop.

c. The presence of a probable six or seven men at the Brittenbach Platz meetings on August 19 and 21, and the movements of the Opsl, indicate that an actual kidnap attempt may have been planned for either of these meetings if conditions proved favorable. If so, the decoy's retaining of the initiative, each time choosing the cafe to be used for the meeting, undoubtedly prevented an attempt's being made.

d. The fact that no one was observed covering the meeting of August 23, would indicate that no kidnap attempt was planned for this meeting; the Cafe Wiena meeting of August 22, may have resulted in a shift in tactics, possibly based on the delivery of the 6,000 leaflets.

e. Identity 1's conversation with the decoy DT-6 at the August 23, meeting appears in no way to indicate a loss of interest or withdrawal.

12. Measures taken.

a. Before Public Safety was brought into the case, the basic decision was made that our aim was not merely to prevent a kidnapping and/or to protect DT-6, but to trap the kidnap group and, if possible, its leaders in an overt act of attempted abduction sufficient for legal prosecution, to be exploited propagandistically as a counter-action to the kidnapping of Dr. Linse. To accomplish this it was essential that an overt act be committed and that the operation be carried out with sufficient care and over a sufficient period to prevent premature action or exposure of our countermeasures. This line of action incidentally was approved also by ☐ during their visit to Berlin.

b. The police operation was therefore turned over to Public Safety rather than to the central West Berlin police administration in order to insure the essential initial impetus and follow through from above. Public Safety will continue to exercise direct supervision over the Sektoren Assistant and the carrying out of the operation.


c. Identity 1's work shop is being kept under police surveillance and for DT-6's protection a plainclothes guard has also been stationed at his house on a 24 hour basis.

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d. The DT-6 decoy is making every attempt to keep the initiative and to force Identity 1 to continue the wooing process. The next meeting will not take place until at least Friday, August 29, to allow more time for surveillance of Identity 1 and coordination with the police of plans for the next moves.

12. Any significant new developments outside of the pattern outlined above will be reported by cable.

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ENCLOSURE TO 1318 CENFO

IDENTITY 1: HERMUT MUSSEHL

IDENTITY 2: FRANZ DR. ROSS

*add
atm.*

13C INC.
3-FRUGHT
3-DYGLAVIER, Wash.

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